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An assessment of the effectiveness of rebates 
for keeping the over-60s in employment
Traditionally, employment policies in Spain have rested to a greater extent than in other 
countries on the application of rebates to the Social Security contributions of specific groups. 
The international empirical evidence on the effectiveness of this type of programme tends to 
show that, in general, these programmes involve a high budgetary cost, with limited although 
positive effects on the groups concerned, without affecting the aggregate level of employment. 
With the aim of providing additional evidence on this matter, this article summarises the 
results of an exercise assessing a specific Social Security contribution rebates programme 
in force from 2006 to 2012 for the group of workers over 60. Specifically, using data from the 
Spanish MCVL (Social Security administrative labour records), the effect that the elimination 
of this rebates programme had on the probability of these workers losing their job is estimated. 
The results show that the elimination of the incentives gave rise to a positive and significant 
although limited impact on the probability of this group losing their job, which was 
concentrated among the low-skilled, with relatively few years of service in the firm and with 
lower severance costs. Overall, the evidence would indicate that the programme produced 
scant benefits in terms of a higher rate of employment retention for the group of workers 
concerned. These findings are confined to this specific programme and, therefore, they are 
not extensible to the range of employment rebates for different groups that have been in 
force in the past in Spain or are so are present, although they highlight the need for a detailed 
assessment of active employment policies providing for an analysis of their effectiveness.
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In Spain, employment policies have been geared more intensively than in other countries 
towards incentives to promote the permanent employment of specific groups, such as the 
young, the long-term unemployed and the elderly, normally through rebates on employers’ 
Social Security contributions. For example, Spain was among the OECD countries with the 
highest spending as a percentage of GDP on employment incentives, posting 0.3% on 
average from 2004 to 20111, a figure only exceeded in the same period by Belgium, Sweden, 
Denmark and Luxembourg. In terms of the percentage of employment affected by this type 
of rebate, Spain ranked first throughout this period, with 8.6% of employment, far above 
the average level (1.7%) observed among the OECD countries with available information. 
However, the empirical evidence available tends to throw up rather unfavourable results 
regarding the effectiveness of this type of incentives programme. In particular, Barceló and 
Villanueva (2016) find some positive effects of the regional subsidies for permanent 
employment, increasing the probability that the groups subject to rebates will attain such 
employment. However, the costs associated with these programmes are high and most of 
the empirical evidence tends to show that any increase in probability appears, in any 
event, to arise largely at the expense of other groups, without these incentives exerting 
lasting effects on the aggregate rate of employment or on permanent employment [see, 
inter alia, Kugler et al. (2003), Toharia et al. (2008) and García Pérez and Rebollo (2009)]2.
With the aim of providing additional evidence on the effectiveness of this type of incentive, 
this article summarises the results of a recently published paper3 which analyses the 
effectiveness of a specific programme aimed at maintaining jobs for the over-60s that was 
in force from 2006 until July 2012. A detailed description follows of the characteristics of 
the programme, the strategy used to analyse its impact and the empirical findings on its 
effects. The third section includes an initial approximation to the cost/benefit analysis for 
the public sector of this programme. 
This programme was introduced in 2006 and was aimed at keeping elderly workers – 
specifically those aged over 60, with a permanent contract and with at least five years’ service 
within the firm – in employment. In this connection, 50% rebates were offered on employers’ 
Social Security contributions for workers aged 60, with a 10 pp increase in the rebate per year 
up to a ceiling of 100% for those aged 64. The essential justification behind these incentives is 
the declining path employee productivity usually follows after a certain age [Skirbekk (2004)], 
which gives rise to a gap between this productivity and the attendant wage, which adversely 
affects the probability of keeping this group in employment [Ilmakunnas y Maliranta (2005)].
To assess the effectiveness of these incentives over the period they were in force, this 
article resorts to analysing firms’ reaction after the exogenous increase in labour costs 
Introduction
Estimating the impact  
of the programme of 
incentives for keeping the 
over-60s in employment 
1  The OECD average stood at 0.13% in this same period.
2  More recently, Gamberoni et al. (2016) have also found similar results on analysing the impact of tax incentives 
associated with the “entrepreneurial contract” approved in the 2012 labour market reform. 
3  See Font et al. (2017).
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arising from the elimination of the incentives in July 2012.4 This elimination prompted an 
unexpected increase in the labour costs of firms that employed the workers affected by 
this programme of 10-22.2%, depending on the age of the worker. In analysing the impact 
it does not suffice to observe the changes in the employment of the related group of 
workers after July 2012, since other factors, such as the economic situation, might explain 
such changes. Accordingly, a peer or control group of workers must be found that has not 
undergone any change regarding rebates, but which is comparable to the group affected 
in terms of the expected impact of the rest of the factors that affect the probability of 
remaining in employment. 
In this case use is made of a control group taken from another employment retention 
programme that was in force until late 2012 for workers aged 59 with a permanent contract 
and at least four years’ service.5 This programme was not eliminated between July and 
December; rather, its discontinuation was postponed until early 2013, owing to an 
administrative issue.6 As a result, a five-month period is available to compare the paths of 
both groups of workers. In terms of the characteristics of the groups concerned, they are 
both very similar as regards variables such as tenure, the incidence of part-time employment 
and average wages.7
Accordingly, the impact of the elimination of the employment retention subsidies is 
analysed by observing the relative changes in the probability of job loss after July 2012 
among the group of workers that ceased to have this rebate, setting them against the 
group of workers that retained the rebate until the end of the year. In principle, the two 
groups are very similar and, therefore, they would be similarly affected by the other 
economic factors that may influence the probability of job loss. 
For this analysis, data from the MCVL (Social Security administrative labour records) are 
used. These provide all the labour market transitions of a random, non-stratified sample of 
4% of the individuals with some relationship to the Social Security system. In particular, 
individuals who were working in January 2012 are considered, and these are tracked 
throughout the year until December. Chart 1 shows the difference in the proportion of 
these workers who lost their job up to the related month, depending on whether they 
belong to the group of workers aged 60-64 or to the control group (aged 59). 
On the basis of this information it is clearly seen how, on a positive slope, which indicates 
that the over-60s workers have a uniformly greater probability of losing their job during the 
year, a change arises in this difference as from July 2012. Specifically, in that month, 
coinciding with the elimination of the incentives, the probability of job loss increased for 
the group of workers concerned. Moreover, when this same analysis is repeated for 
previous years this break is observed not to have taken place, thereby ruling out the 
possibility that other, conjunctural-like factors might explain this difference as from July 
each year. 
4  RDL 20/2012 dated 13 July 2012.
5  The firms received a 40% Social Security contribution rebate under this programme. 
6  In particular, the subsidy for the over-60s was legally from a previous Royal Decree-Law, which remained in force 
until being revoked on 13 July 2012. Conversely, the rebate for the workers aged 59 was renewed year by year 
under the State Budget. In 2013 there was no such renewal, meaning the rebate survived until end-2012. 
7  Font et al. (2017) show how another potential control group, that of workers aged 60 or over with a permanent 
contract but with fewer than five years’ service in the firm, is a less suitable control group for the analysis, as 
it presents substantial differences from the group subject to the rebate in terms of variables such as tenure in 
the firm, the incidence of part-time employment, male/female distribution and average wages. 
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To quantify the scale of the effect of the disappearance of the rebates in summer 2012 on 
the probability of job retention, a probit model is estimated in which the variable to be 
explained is the probability of the worker losing his/her job between August and December 
2012. The usual control variables that may affect this probability are included, such as 
worker age, sex, years of tenure and level of educational attainment, and our variable of 
interest that identifies the workers whose subsidy was eliminated in July 2012. Moreover, 
this variable interacts with worker age and years of service to control for possible effects 
other than the elimination of the subsidy for these groups of workers. 
The results of this estimation are in line with expectations as to the effect of the control 
variables on the probability of job loss, i.e. this probability increases with age and 
diminishes with level of educational attainment and level of experience. As regards the 
impact of our variable of interest, the probability of workers losing their job between 
August and December 2012 is estimated to have increased from 6.7% to 8.5% once the 
subsidies were eliminated (see Table 1). Accordingly, the end of employment maintenance 
subsidies prompted a small but significant increase (1.8 pp) in the probability of workers 
aged over 60 losing their job. If we differentiate this impact for different groups of 
workers, the impact of the elimination of the rebates can be seen to increase with age8 
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ELIMINATION OF INCENTIVES DIFFERENCE IN THE PROBABILITY OF JOB LOSS LINEAR TREND (WITH DATA TO AUGUST)
8  That said, the lower number of observations when we distinguish between specific ages means that some 
estimates are not significant.
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biggest increase in the probability of losing their job following the elimination of the 
incentives.9 In terms of level of educational attainment, the probability of job loss for a 
worker with a low-skilled job increased from 6.8% to 8.8%, while for high-skilled jobs no 
significant increase was observed.10 Finally, the most interesting results arise on 
analysing different levels of years of service in the firm. In particular, the probability of job 
loss increased for workers with fewer years of service within the group of workers 
covered by the programme, with an increase of 2.7 pp following the elimination of the 
subsidy (statistically significant at the level of 1%). The increase is lower for those with 
10-17 years of service (1.9 pp) and the elimination of the rebates did not appear to have 
a significant effect for employees with the most years of service within the firm (over 18 
years). This finding might suggest that the high dismissal costs associated with workers 
with long years of service in the firm may have acted as a sufficient incentive to keep the 
workers in the firm; accordingly, the elimination of the rebates did not feed through to a 
greater probability of job loss for this sub-set of workers, although it might also reflect a 
positive relationship between length of service within the firm and employee productivity. 
Overall, the foregoing results indicate that the elimination of the programme of incentives 
for keeping the over-60s in employment in force from 2006 to July 2012 had a positive 
effect on the probability of job loss for this group in the short term, which was on a low 
scale but was particularly significant among workers with the fewest years of service and 
skills within the group affected. This section makes an initial approach to the approximate 
cost-benefit analysis of this policy for the public sector. In this connection, on the basis of 
the probit model results described in the previous section that enable the impact of the 
elimination of the employment subsidies to be estimated, a calculation is made of the 
An initial approximation  
to the cost-benefit 
analysis of the programme 
     9  Within this group, exit from employment is, essentially, towards retirement status, instead of unemployment, 
reflecting the possibilities for this group of acceding to retirement. 
10  This may be related to the fact that, typically, the productivity of skilled employees tends to increase more with 
age, even for the final years of working life; hence, it is to be expected that the rebates will be largely ineffective 
in respect of skilled employment, and that their withdrawal will have few effects.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTE: *, **, ***, significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
With rebate Without rebate Difference
** 8.15.87.6etagerggA
    By age
* 5.10.75.506        
1.17.66.516        
* 1.28.77.526        
6.10.113.936        
** 6.41.515.0146        
    By years of tenure
*** 7.27.90.7sraey 9-5        
** 9.14.85.6sraey 71-01        
8.03.75.6sraey 81>        
    By level of educational attainment
** 0.28.88.6muidem dna woL        
6.00.64.5hgiH        
Estimated probability of job loss
ESTIMATED IMPACT OF REBATES ON THE PROBABILITY OF JOB LOSS TABLE 1
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effect of this loss of employment on the wages and the Social Security contributions 
which, consequently, cease to be made and the unemployment benefits that are paid to 
these workers who lose their job. This estimation of the cost entailed by their elimination 
is compared with the cost that maintaining the incentives programme in force – namely, 
the cost of the subsidy – would have involved. 
The results of a simple comparative statics exercise, in which other dynamic effects 
associated with the elimination of the subsidies cannot be taken into account11, show that 
the elimination of the incentives is expected to have translated, on our estimates, into a 
loss of €3.1 million in wages in December 2012, as a result of the workers who lost their 
job, which in turn would have reduced the revenue stemming from Social Security 
contributions by €1.1 million.  In turn, these job losses are estimated to have raised 
unemployment benefit expenditure by €1.1 million. Moreover, the discontinuation of the 
payment of the subsidies resulted in a saving of €41.7 million for the Social Security system 
in that period, meaning that the estimated net saving for the latter of the elimination of the 
programme is significant. 
The foregoing results are in line with the empirical evidence available on the effectiveness 
of the programme of Social Security contribution rebates mentioned in the introduction, 
which tends to evidence a high deadweight12 component to this type of measure (around 
85% in the case under analysis), given that they do not decisively affect firms’ employment 
decisions. In the specific case of the rebates analysed, the results show that most of the 
programme’s expenditure is not recouped in terms of greater labour income of the group 
of workers affected or via lower expenditure on unemployment benefits. The intuition 
behind this result is that the incentives managed to maintain employment only for a small 
sub-set of workers, probably reflecting the fact that the programme’s target group already 
had certain characteristics – permanent contracts and long years of service – that led to 
them having a relatively low probability of job loss, irrespective of the existence or not of a 
rebate. The results highlight the need for these types of programmes to be focused on very 
specific groups with particular employment difficulties, with a view to maximising its 
effectiveness in terms of job creation or maintenance and minimising its cost for public 
finances.
It should be stressed, however, that the findings presented in this article are confined to 
this specific programme of incentives and, therefore, they are not extensible to the set of 
employment rebates for different groups in force in Spain in the past or at present; 
nonetheless, they do highlight the need for a detailed assessment of the different 
programmes of active employment policies in order to detect those that are most effective.
16.11.2017.
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